The finding that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility tend to have low future returns has been dubbed an empirical anomaly in the finance literature. We seek to understand this puzzle by separating the "upside" volatility associated with positive idiosyncratic returns from the "downside" risk associated with negative idiosyncratic returns. We find that "downside" risk is not inversely related to future stock returns, thus easing the concern that the empirical anomaly is a mispricing of risk. Rather, our results suggest that it is "upside" volatility that drives the inverse idiosyncratic volatility and return relation. We further relate our results on the relation between future returns and "downside" and "upside" volatility to investor underreaction to "bad" news and overreaction to "good" news. Finally, we show that momentum strategies may be enhanced by taking into account stocks' "upside" variation.
I. Introduction
Classical finance theory of Markowitz (1952) , Sharpe (1964) , and Litner (1965) puts forth that investors are mean-variance optimizers and hold fully-diversified portfolios. In this setting, though expected returns are positively related to market risk, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away and, therefore, not priced. Merton (1987) , however, suggests that information acquisition costs may cause investors to hold underdiversified portfolios. Consequently, investors demand compensation for firm-specific risk and, at the cross-sectional level, stock returns should be positively related to idiosyncratic risk. This prediction is extended in the behavioral model of Barberis and Huang (2001) and in recent work by Malkiel and Xu (2002) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) .
Although the rationale underlying the above theories is clear, empirical evidence presented in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006a) challenges both theoretical predictions. In particular, they show that the average return of the quintile portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility is higher than that of the quintile portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic volatility by 1.06% per month. The difference is statistically significant and robust to controlling for value, size, liquidity, volume, dispersion of analysts forecasts, and momentum effects. The inverse idiosyncratic volatility and return relation remains using different formation periods for computing idiosyncratic volatility and different holding periods. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006b) show that this empirical anomaly cannot be explained by the effect of transactions costs, the delay of stock price response to information (per Hou and Moskowitz (2005) ), information asymmetry among investors (see Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) ), or higher moments of stock returns such as skewness (see Barberis and Huang (2007) ). In a recent study, Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2006) further indicate that the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly is not a simple manifestation of previously documented market anomalies related to excessive extrapolation on firm growth, overinvestment that results from empire-building managers, accounting accruals, or investor underreaction to earnings news.
Perplexed by both the clear contradiction of the empirical evidence with the theoretical predictions of Markowitz (1952) as well as Merton (1987) and a lack of explanations, in this paper we examine whether the inverse relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future returns is indeed a mispricing of risk. To do this, we separate negative idiosyncratic returns from positive idiosyncratic returns, and measure idiosyncratic volatility on both "downside" and "upside." Our approach is based on the long established argument in the literature that investors react differently to downside losses than they do to upside gains. In fact, Markowitz (1959) proposes semivariance (rather than variance) to measure of risk because semivariance measures losses on the downside rather than gains on the upside.
1 Additionally, empirical literature has documented that stock returns are asymmetric, and some stock returns are more skewed than others, making total idiosyncratic volatility an imperfect measure of risk across stocks. Because "upside" volatility associated with positive idiosyncratic returns hardly can be perceived by investors as "risk," risk may be more sensibly captured by a measure of volatility associated with negative idiosyncratic returns. 2 Further, risk measures such as value-at-risk (VAR) focus primarily on the downside of asset return distributions.
In our analysis, we construct measures of downside and upside idiosyncratic volatility, and relate each of them to future stock returns. Formally, downside volatility is measured by the semi-standard deviation of negative idiosyncratic returns, and upside volatility is measured by the semi-standard deviation of positive idiosyncratic returns. We show that both upside and downside volatility are persistent over time across stocks and that controlling for downside volatility eliminates the relation between future stock returns and downside risk; i.e., stocks with high downside volatility do not have low future returns. This evidence eases the concern that investors misprice risk when valuing stocks. In contrast, we find that stocks with high upside volatility do earn low subsequent returns. In fact, the upside volatility has strong predictive power for future returns, and the return predictability is robust to controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity, and past returns. At the quarterly frequency, for example, the average return of stocks in the quintile 1 In a recent study, Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) examine the systematic downside risk of stocks and find a significant risk premium of downside risk based on cross-section of stock returns.
2 While various existing studies have proposed utility functions to measure investor preferences towards asymmetric asset return distributions (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , among others), in this paper we simply separate negative and positive returns.
with the lowest upside volatility is greater than that of stocks in the quintile with the highest upside volatility by 3.19%. In comparison, the average return differential between the top and bottom quintile portfolios sorted on total idiosyncratic volatility is only 2.56%. Finally, the inverse relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is entirely driven by the cross-sectional differences in upside volatility. Once we control for upside volatility, idiosyncratic volatility no longer inversely predicts future returns.
While the empirical evidence of our study alleviates a concern about risk mispricing, it raises important new questions. The insignificant relation between downside risk and future stock returns implies that stocks with high downside risk are not compensated with high returns, as predicted by Merton (1987) . Why is downside risk not priced by investors? Further, the significant inverse relation between upside volatility and future stock returns indicates that there is a negative premium associated with upside volatility. This is consistent with neither the classical finance theory of Markowitz (1952) , Sharpe (1964) , and Litner (1965) nor the segmented information theory of Merton (1987) . So, what then drives the predictive power of upside volatility for returns?
We link the above empirical findings to various hypotheses of investor behavior postulated in the existing literature. In particular, we examine whether the insignificant relation between downside risk and future returns is evidence of investor underreaction to "bad" news (see, e.g., Hong and Stein (1999) or Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) ), and whether the inverse relation between upside volatility and expected returns accords with investor overreaction to "good" news (see, for example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) or Ahmed, Lobo, and Zhang (2000) ). Specifically, when examining the effect of downside risk or "bad" news, we control for cross-sectional variation in "good" news using both upside volatility and past stock returns. Additionally, Miller (1977) suggests that stock prices reflect optimism in the presence of short-sale constraints because investors with relatively pessimistic views of a stock are kept out of the market so, when investors' beliefs are diverse enough and there are short sales constraints, stocks may not fully reflect bad news and may therefore be overvalued. We therefore examine the effect of short sale constraints on the relation between downside risk and future stock returns. Similarly, when examining the return-predictability of upside volatility, we control for cross-sectional variation in "bad" news using both downside volatility and past stock returns. Our results do not reject the hypotheses that investors tend to underreact to "bad" news and overreact to "good" news.
Based on Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) who document that past return patterns (such as the sequence of positive returns) have predictive power for future returns, we also examine whether the predictive power of upside volatility for subsequent is related to the patterns of past returns.
Because information may arrive gradually or may come as an unanticipated shock, and because return patterns may reflect stock price changes in response to different types of information, or different ways investors react to news, or both, we focus on two types of return realizations: one is a gradual change in stock prices, and the other represents a sudden change in stock prices. We find that the predictive power of upside volatility for returns is stronger among stocks with gradual increases in past stock prices. Interestingly, for those stocks with sudden increases in past prices, upside volatility has no predictive power for future stock returns.
Our analysis suggests that upside stock return volatility is not only inversely predictive of future stock returns, but also positively related to past stock returns. This result indicates that combining past stock returns and upside volatility has the potential to increase the profits from the momentum strategy, which is based on the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) finding that stocks with high past returns continue to outperform stocks with relatively low past returns for up to 12 months. Indeed, sorting stocks into quintile portfolios according to upside volatility, our results show that momentum only exists among stocks in the three quintiles with the highest upside volatility. For those stocks with relatively low upside volatility, the momentum effect is insignificant, and there is actually a slight reversal. Further, forming quintile portfolios using past 3-month returns, the average return differential between winners and losers over the next three months is 2.23%. Once we restrict the stock space to the 40% of stocks with the greatest upside volatility, the average return of the momentum strategy is improved to 4.47%. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and confirms the idiosyncratic volatility-return anomaly. In Section III, we construct measures of upside and downside idiosyn-cratic volatility and provide new evidence on the idiosyncratic volatility-return anomaly. Section IV considers possible explanations of our findings and explores how they may be used to enhance momentum strategies. Section V concludes.
II. The Idiosyncratic Volatility Anomaly

A. Data and Idiosyncratic Return Volatility
In our analysis, we obtain data from three sources: CRSP, Compustat, and Thomson Financial 13F, with sample period from 1980 to 2005. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated from daily stock returns in CRSP for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Specifically, we measure idiosyncratic volatility (henceforth, IVOL) as the standard deviation of the residuals from the following 4-factor model:
where r t denotes daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate, r mt is the daily excess market return, and SMB t , HML t , and UMD t are daily Fama and French factors obtained from Ken French's website. We use the CRSP value-weighted index returns as a proxy for market returns, and the 3-month T-bill yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate. We note that all of our results are robust to estimating idiosyncratic volatility using residuals from both a market model and the Fama-French 3-Factor model as well as using simple raw returns.
In our analysis, we eliminate American Depository Receipts (ADRs), foreign companies, closedend funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), primes, and scores, as well as stocks with prices below $5.00 at the end of each portfolio formation period. We follow Shumway (1997) to adjust returns of delisted stocks when the delisting is performance-related and the delisting return is missing in CRSP. To mitigate concerns about the noisiness of daily data, robust estimates of the coefficients (βs) are obtained from monthly returns and monthly factors over the past 5 years on a rolling basis, where at least 24 monthly observations are required. When the estimates of beta coefficients are unavailable, we use the mean estimate of the relevant beta coefficients over the entire sample period for the stock. The results are almost identical if we use a 3-year (36 month) rolling window to estimate the beta coefficients.
In Table I , Panel A, we report the mean and median number of firms in our sample, as well as the time series average of mean and median statistics of IVOL. The cross-sectional mean and median statistics of IVOL are calculated first in each month or quarter, and then averaged over time.
We perform analyses at both the monthly and quarterly frequencies and require a stock to have at least 15 daily observations (3 weeks) over a month to be included in the monthly analysis, and at least 44 daily observations (2 months) over a quarter to be included in the quarterly analysis. IVOL is normalized to either monthly or quarterly measures using the averaging number of trading days:
22 per month or 63 per quarter. As reported in Table I , the mean (median) IVOLs at the monthly and quarterly horizons are 13.53 (11.59) and 25.13 (22.26), respectively. Summary statistics of IVOL in subsamples of stocks sorted on size, book-to-market, momentum, and turnover are given in Table I , Panel B. We measure size as the market capitalization at the end of each month or quarter. Book-to-market is from Compustat data based on book value from annual statements of the most recent fiscal year. Momentum is calculated as the buy-and-hold return over the 11 month period before the beginning of the last month of the portfolio formation period. 3 Finally, turnover is calculated as the average monthly ratio of trading volume to total number of shares outstanding.
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Because Nasdaq is a dealer market with double counting of dealer buys and sells, the turnover of stocks traded on Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex is not directly comparable (see, e.g., Atkins and Dyl, 1997). As a simple remedy, we divide the turnover of Nasdaq stocks by two.
Consistent with extant literature, idiosyncratic volatility is higher for small capitalization stocks, stocks with low book-to-market ratios (growth stocks) and stocks with high turnover at both the monthly and quarterly frequency. When sorting by momentum, however, idiosyncratic volatility is U-shaped; i.e., it is high for stocks with both high and low past returns (winners and losers).
B. Idiosyncratic Volatility and Future Stock Returns
In this subsection, we motivate our study by replicating the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly documented in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006a) . Table II Carhart (1997) 4-factor models further show that the return differentials are robust to the effects of size, book to market, and momentum. Specifically, using the 3-and 4-factor models results in a respective return difference of 1.86% and 1.52% per quarter, both of which are statistically significant. Finally, it is worth noting that while the returns and αs of quintile portfolios are not monotonic in Period 1, all relations are monotonic in Period 2. For example, raw holding period returns over Quarter 2 decrease from 4.43% to 2.20% (the difference is statistically significant) as we move from the low to high IVOL portfolios. The differences in 3-and 4-factor αs remain statistically significant.
Overall, the results in Table II suggest that idiosyncratic volatility predicts future returns at both the monthly and quarterly horizons. Though these results are consistent with the aforementioned literature, they are at odds with classical asset pricing models. In particular, given the persistence in cross-sectional volatility, the inverse relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns can be perceived as a contradiction to the conventional paradigm that suggests a tradeoff between risk and expected returns. Thus, regardless of whether idiosyncratic risk should be related to returns (see Markowitz (1952 ) vis-`a-vis Merton (1987 ), it is difficult to justify why high idiosyncratic volatility would be followed by low returns. 5 In the sections that follow, we seek to understand the IVOL-return "puzzle" by breaking IVOL into downside and upside components.
III. New Evidence on the Idiosyncratic Volatility and Return
Relation
In this section, we directly test whether the idiosyncratic volatility-return relation is a rejection of the fundamental trade-off between risk and return. To do this, we construct risk measures that separate upside volatility from downside risk. The idea that investors are more concerned with losses than they are with gains is well-documented (see, for example, Roy (1952 ), Markowitz (1959 , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , and Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) , among others). Thus, it is reasonable to consider upside and downside return volatility separately because asymmetric attitudes toward losses and gains may cause investors to demand higher returns for holding downside risk relative to upside volatility. Because we separate idiosyncratic risk into upside and downside components, our paper is distinct from Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) who focus only on such components of systematic, or market, risk.
5 While Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2005) finds that the short-sale constraint theory presented in Miller (1977) is consistent with idiosyncratic volatility anomaly, there is inclusive evidence that short-sale constraint is the cause. Empirical evidence in D'Avolio (2002), Nagel (2005) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004) suggests that short-sale constraint is not binding for most of stocks, and the cost of short sale rarely exceeds 1 to 2% per year.
A. Separating Up from Down
The basic intuition of our approach is that while IVOL reflects variation of stock returns, volatility associated with positive returns hardly can be viewed as "risk" by investors. Thus, we construct a risk measure that isolates the downside (negative) component of returns. We first define the following risk measures, respectively associated with negative and positive residual returns ( t ):
As in the previous section, the above estimates are also normalized to monthly and quarterly measures using the average number of trading days during a month and quarter. By construction,
According to the above definitions, IVOL down measures downside variation in returns, and IVOL up measures upside variation. As noted in Section II, our results are not sensitive to the factor model used to obtain the residuals and defining the above measures using raw stock returns instead of residual returns yields similar results.
In Table III Table I , however, is that while IVOL down is greater for growth or low book-to-market stocks, IVOL up exhibits little variation between high and low high book-to-market stocks. Figure 1 illustrates the asymmetric return distributions across size, book-to-market, momentum, and turnover terciles. The return distributions are generated using normal densities but different up and down standard deviations, based on the median values of IVOL up and IVOL down at the quarterly frequency in each stock tercile (from Table III) . 6 These plots demonstrate the difference in return volatility across stocks. The return distribution is mostly asymmetric, with greater downside risk than upside volatility. More importantly, there is a great variation of asymmetry across stocks. For example, we observe a significantly more negative skewness for low book-to-market and high turnover stocks, but much less skewness in the return distributions of large stocks and high book-to-market stocks. Overall, Figure 1 makes it clear that, cross-sectionally, stocks have very different return distributions. Such variation in return distributions highlights the importance of using separate measures for downside and upside volatility to capture the risk differential across stocks.
We now examine how IVOL down (our measure of downside risk) is related to future returns. If investors misprice risk, we should find an even stronger inverse relation between downside risk and future returns than the one between total idiosyncratic volatility and future returns. In Table IV, respective Panels A and B, we report the average future stock returns and αs of quintile portfolios formed on the downside volatility (IVOL down ) for the monthly and quarterly frequencies. The results suggest that IVOL down is also persistent over time. The average portfolio holding period returns as well as the Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor αs over the next two periods are also shown. As can be seen, IVOL down predicts future returns at neither the monthly nor the 6 Specifically, the density of the return distribution is given by f(r) = Thus, the return predictability arising from volatility documented in Table II when we consider IVOL down has disappeared. Instead, the insignificant inverse relation between return and downside risk seems to be evidence that risk is actually not mispriced by investors. We explore why downside risk is not priced in Section IV, but now turn our focus to the relation between IVOL up or positive return volatility, which measures upside "risk", and subsequent returns. Since the downside risk fails to predict future returns, we expect that the predictive power of total idiosyncratic volatility for returns must be driven by upside volatility. in Quarter 1 raw returns between the high and low IVOL portfolios is 3.19%, with a t-statistic of 3.38. Accounting for the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum does not affect our results:
3-and 4-factor αs are also economically and statistically significant with differences of 3.30% and 3.27% over the quarter, and respective t-statistics of 5.70 and 4.89. Further unreported reported results confirm that once we control for upside volatility, total idiosyncratic volatility is no longer predictive of future stock returns. In other words, it is upside return variation that drives the results presented in Table II . As a matter of fact, compared to total IVOL, IVOL up is a less noisy predictor of future stock returns. In particular, the difference in the raw holding period return during Quarter 1 between the top and bottom quintiles sorted on Quarter 0 IVOL up is 3.19%, whereas that number based on Quarter 0 total IVOL (from Table II ) is 2.56%.
For robustness, we examine the extent to which our results hold over an extended horizon.
Specifically, we consider the relationship between IVOL up in Period 0 and subsequent returns in Periods 1 through 6. Plots giving the return differential between returns in subsequent periods for high and low period 0 IVOL up portfolios are presented in Figure 2 . Panels A and B, respectively, define "periods" in terms of months and quarters. As can be seen from Panel A, the return differential between high and low IVOL up portfolios is positive overall (and at its highest at approximately 1% per month in the first month), but it is only significant up to Month 4 after portfolio formation.
Panel B shows that the return predictability formed on IVOL up over Quarter 0 is somewhat longer.
While the return differential between high and low IVOL up portfolios is positive overall (it is just over 3% in Quarter 1), it is only statistically significant up to Quarter 3. Results examining 3-factor and 4-factor αs are similar and are available upon request. We conclude that the predictive power of IVOL maintains its significance for approximately a one-year horizon.
As additional robustness checks, we provide subsample results controlling for size, book-tomarket, momentum, and turnover in Table V , Panels C1-C4. That is, we examine returns to 25 portfolios based on two-way sequential sorts, first sorting on the relevant characteristic and then on IVOL up . Panel C1 shows sorts on size. As can be seen, the results are especially strong in the smaller portfolios. In fact, other than in the quintile of the largest stocks, the inverse relation between risk and return is highly significant. And, even after controlling for size, the average return for the low IVOL up portfolio is significantly greater, economically, than it is for the high IVOL up portfolio (4.73% v. 1.19% per quarter, as can be seen in the bottom row of Panel C1). A t-statistic of 4.05 suggests this difference is also statistically significant. Table V, Panels C2, C3 and C4 show that the inverse relation at the quarterly frequency is significant in all quintiles of book-to-market, momentum and turnover. However, the inverse relation appears U-shaped in the subgroups sorted by book-to-market and momentum: the result is strongest for both growth and value stocks, as well as for both winners and losers. Among the subgroups of turnover, the result is strongest for stocks with highest turnover. Again, the bottom row of each Table V subpanel shows that the inverse relation remains significant even after controlling for book-to-market, momentum, and turnover.
B. A New "Risk" Measure and its Relation with Returns
Overall, our results suggest that there is no significant risk premium associated with downside risk, but a significantly negative premium associated with upside volatility. Existing literature on loss aversion suggests investors are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains (as examples, see Roy (1952) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , or Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) , among others). Since investors draw negative utility from downside losses, but positive utility from upside gains, a possible measure of risk is the relative difference between the downside and upside. For example, a stock with a large amount of negative return volatility relative to positive return volatility should earn a higher return than a stock with little downside risk and significant positive return variation. In this subsection, we construct a new "risk" measure based on the asymmetry of the return distribution and examine how this new measure of "asymmetric risk" relates to subsequent returns. We define "asymmetric risk" ( IVOL asym ) as downside risk (IVOL down ) less upside potential (IVOL up ):
Though the risk measure we create above places equal weights on upside and downside volatilities, it allows us to understand how investors react to different levels of downside variation relative to upside variation. Note that IVOL asym may be positive or negative depending on the relative magnitudes of its determinants, but for a symmetric return distribution, IVOL asym = 0. In contrast, if a security has more (less) downside than upside variation, then IVOL asym > (<)0. 7 Rational asset pricing suggests that stocks with large IVOL asym (i.e., more downside risk) will have higher 7 As expected, this risk measure is highly correlated with return skewness. The mean (median) of cross-sectional correlation between skewness and IVOL asym is −0.73 (−0.71). Our results, however, show that compared to IVOL asym , return skewness has weaker predictive power of future stock returns. For example, at the quarterly frequency, when stocks are sorted based on the skewness of residual returns, the average return difference between the bottom and top quintiles is 1.11% with a t-statistic of 2.32. The differences of 3-and 4-factor alphas are respectively 1.63% (t = 3.73) and 2.07% (t = 3.89). expected returns. Using IVOL asym as a measure of risk, we repeat the analysis used to generate Tables IV and V. Table VI By definition, IVOL asym is positively correlated with IVOL down but negatively correlated with IVOL up at the monthly and quarterly horizons. As expected from the persistence of both upside and downside IVOL, the asymmetric volatility is also highly persistent. Unreported results show that, in the two periods following the portfolio formation period, the difference in IVOL asym between the top and bottom quintile portfolios are highly significant. Table VI indicates that stocks with high levels of asymmetric volatility (or, put differently, significantly more downside than upside return variation) earn higher subsequent returns. At the quarterly horizon, for example, the low IVOL asym portfolio has a mean subsequent quarterly return of 2.46%, while the riskiest portfolio has an average return of 4.02% in the subsequent quarter. This difference in returns is a statistically significant −1.55% per quarter (t = −2.31). Thus, the results in Table VI show that asymmetric risk is priced in the market: there is a positive relation between this measure of risk and subsequent returns, and it appears this risk is rationally priced. Indeed, stocks with relatively more downside risk require a higher rate of return. Adjusting returns according to the 3-factor and 4-factor models, we have respective differences in abnormal returns of 2.56% and 2.88% per quarter with the portfolio of large negative risk earning a statistically significant return premium.
To confirm that the return predictive power of IVOL asym is primarily driven by the upside com- 
IV. Further Analysis
While the evidence presented so far offers important new insights on the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly, it also raises important new questions that are both interesting and challenging. In particular, why is downside risk not priced, and what drives the inverse relation between upside "risk" and future stock returns? As mentioned, a traditional framework suggests that idiosyncratic risk should be diversified away and, therefore, not priced. As an alternative, Merton (1987) postulates that idiosyncratic risk may be priced such that investors who bear this risk are compensated with higher expected returns. But, our results are inconsistent with both paradigms. Specifically, the fact that downside risk is not priced is inconsistent with the Merton (1987) story, and the fact that upside "risk" has predictive power for subsequent returns contradicts traditional finance theory.
Additionally, papers like Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) suggest that investors care about systematic downside risk. While it may be reasonable for such systematic risk to be priced, the question of why investors do not care about downside idiosyncratic risk remains, especially in light of our finding that positive IVOL is related to subsequent returns.
In this section, we link our findings to return predictabilities and postulated hypotheses of investor behavior documented in extant literature. Consider, for instance, the pattern of momentum and reversal, viz., that stocks with high past returns continue to earn high returns at horizons ranging from 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ). Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) refer to investment strategies of buying past winners and selling past losers as relative strength strategies, which are widely referred to as momentum strategies in subsequent studies. Fama and French (1996) suggest the momentum effect is not subsumed by the size or value effects, and several behavioral models have been proposed to explain this effect, based on investor underreaction or overreaction to information (see, for example, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (2005)). Alternatively, papers dating back to Miller (1977) suggest that stock prices may reflect optimism in the presence of short-sale constraints because investors with relatively pessimistic views of a stock are kept out of the market so, when investors' beliefs are diverse enough and there are short sales constraints, stocks may not fully reflect bad news and may therefore be overvalued. Finally, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) show that the consistency of positive past returns affects the relation between past returns and the cross-section of expected returns.
In the following subsections, we relate our findings to several hypotheses on investor behavior and evidence on momentum and reversal presented above. Unlike existing literature which examines investor under-and over-reaction at different horizons to understand the documented patterns of momentum and reversal (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ), in this paper, we take as a starting point evidence presented in Chan (2003) , among others, that investors react distinctly to different types of news, viz., good versus bad news. In particular, in Section IV.A., we consider that the insignificant relation between downside volatility and future returns suggests that "bad" news as-sociated with downside volatility is not fully reflected in stock prices and future stock returns are not as high as expected, perhaps a result of investor underreaction. When examining the relation between downside volatility and subsequent returns, we control for cross-sectional variation in "good" news using both upside volatility and past stock returns. Then, in Section IV.B., we focus on the notion that the inverse relation between upside volatility and future returns may imply that investors overreact to "good" news associated with upside volatility, resulting in a correction in future stock prices. When examining the return-predictability of upside volatility, we control for cross-sectional variation in "bad" news using both downside volatility and past stock returns. In this subsection, we also examine the effect of short sale constraints on the relation between downside risk and future stock returns. Finally, in Section IV.C., we examine whether our results can be used to enhance the profitability of momentum strategies.
A. Do Investors Underreact to "Bad" News?
The fact that downside risk is not priced may suggest that bad news associated with negative idiosyncratic returns is not fully priced in current stock prices. As a result, stocks with high downside risk do not have significantly higher future returns. In this sense, the findings are consistent with Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000); viz., if bad news travels slowly and returns do not fully reflect the negative news, then it is unlikely that subsequent returns will be high. To understand why the negative news may not be fully incorporated into price, we consider whether bad news is offset by good news, which would preclude current prices from becoming depressed enough to warrant high subsequent returns. We also explore the possibility that short sale constraints, or market frictions, play a role. We address these potential explanations in Table VII , Panels A and B.
In Table VII , Panel A, we consider whether bad news may be offset by good news by controlling for IVOL up . We first sort on upside IVOL, and then examine how Quarter 1 returns relate to Quarter 0 downside IVOL. As can be seen, the results are substantially similar to those presented in Miller (1977) suggests that short sale constraints may preclude prices from becoming fully informative. More specifically, when institutional ownership is low, short-sale constraints are more likely to bind because the supply of stock available for lending is relatively low. Thus, if the reason we do not see the full incorporation of negative news into price is due to short sale constraints, we would be more likely to see this phenomenon in the portfolios of firms with low institutional ownership. Thus, in Table VII , Panel B, we control for institutional holdings (at the quarterly horizon). Institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors at the end of the portfolio formation quarter. This measure is constructed using the Thomson Financial 13F data over the sample period 1980-2005. As can be seen, although the difference in returns between the low and high downside IVOL portfolios is greatest in the lowest institutional holdings quintile (1.77%), the difference is not statistically significant for any of the quintiles. Further, after controlling for institutional holdings in the bottom row of Panel B, downside IVOL continues to have no predictability for subsequent returns ( t = 0.64). Thus, it does not appear that short sale constraints are responsible for our findings.
B. Do Investors Overreact to "Good" News?
In contrast to the fact that downside risk is not priced, the finding that upside IVOL predicts subsequent returns may suggest that investors overreact to good news, resulting in lower future returns.
Alternatively, it is also possible that good news is offset by bad news, which would explain the negative correlation between upside IVOL in Quarter 0 and Quarter 1 returns. Thus, in Table   VIII , Panel A, we explore the inverse relation between upside IVOL and subsequent returns by controlling for downside risk. We first sort on downside IVOL, and then examine how Quarter 1 returns relate to Quarter 0 upside IVOL. As can be seen, incorporating negative news does not fully explain the phenomenon surrounding upside IVOL. In fact, the results are very similar to those presented in Table V . More specifically, the bottom row of the panel shows that, after controlling for negative news, returns in Quarter 1 decrease from 4.66% to 1.68%, and this difference remains statistically significant ( t = 3.90). We therefore infer that negative news does not drive our result for two reasons. First the predictive power of positive IVOL remains after controlling for downside IVOL. Second, the difference in returns between low and high upside IVOL portfolios is statistically significant in 4 of the 5 negative IVOL portfolios.
8 Nonetheless, the difference in returns between the low and high upside IVOL portfolios is related to the amount of negative news, and actually becomes greater as Quarter 0 downside IVOL increases, suggesting that negative news may play at least a minor role in the negative correlation between upside IVOL and subsequent returns. In particular, the difference between returns in the low and high upside IVOL portfolios increases from 1.34% to 5.31% per quarter as we move to portfolios with greater Quarter 0 negative IVOL. Similar to the case in Section A., one might argue that Quarter 0 downside IVOL may not adequately capture "bad news." Thus, in the lower subpanel of Table VIII , Panel A, we control for Quarter 0 returns. But, even after directly controlling for returns, the implications of our primary findings obtain, and all differences in means remain significant. Overall, our results indicate that the predictability of upside IVOL for subsequent 8 One might notice that both measures give increased weight to large returns (e.g., jumps) because 0 + (2 ) 2 > ( ) 2 + ( ) 2 . A positive jump makes IVOL up large, and a negative jump makes IVOL down large. We will investigate the effect of past return patterns later in our study. returns may not simply be passed off as overreaction. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) suggest that certain return patterns may contain information that predicts future returns. Specifically, they find not only that winners outperform losers but that return consistency is important and that achieving a high past return with a series of steady positive return months generates a larger expected return than does a high past return achieved with just a few extraordinary months. Based on this finding, we consider that information may slowly diffuse through the market or may arrive suddenly in the form of unexpected shocks. We therefore examine what type of upside variation is reversed? To address this question, in Table   VIII , Panel B, we construct additional measures to distinguish between "gradual" and "dramatic" return behavior. In particular, IV OL up ratio, the difference in returns between the high and low upside IVOL portfolios is an insignificant 97 basis points per quarter. But, for the quintile with the highest RET up IV OL up , or the most gradual increase in price, the ability of Quarter 0 upside IVOL to predict returns remains: for this quintile, the return differential is just under 6%, which is highly statistically significant ( t = 4.71). While this table shows that not all upside variation has a correlation with subsequent returns, the bottom row of the panel indicates that, even after controlling for the speed of "adjustment," the portfolio with the lowest upside volatility outperforms that with the most upside variation by 2.49% per quarter, which is both economically and statistically significant (t = 2.29). Overall, it appears that, unlike dramatic positive price changes, gradual positive price changes are more likely to be reversed.
C. Enhanced Momentum Strategy
The results documented so far suggest that IVOL up has greater predictability for returns than does the traditional measure of idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). In particular, differences in subsequent quarter raw returns, 3-and 4-factor αs between the high and low Quarter 0 IVOL portfolios are 2.56%, 1.86%, and 1.52%. These respective numbers increase to 3.19%, 3.30%, and 3.27% when we sort based on Quarter 0 upside volatility. Given the strength and persistence of our results, in this section, we explore the possibility that our results have relevant implications for momentum strategies, which maintain that stocks with high past returns tend to have high future returns (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ). More specifically, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that, conditional on upside IVOL, stocks with high current returns tend to have low future returns (an inverse relation), which is a result of the fact that the high returns are associated with high volatility. Identifying such stocks and excluding them from momentum portfolios could potentially improve momentum strategy profits. We therefore examine a momentum trading strategy that takes advantage of our findings. Results are presented in Table IX . from months −2 to 0 (left hand side) and on returns in the previous year, viz., months −11 to −1 (right hand side). Besides simply confirming significant momentum at the quarterly frequency, the columns of this panel that include Quarter 0 average IVOL up for each momentum quintile indicate that the relation between momentum and upside return variation is not one-to-one, even if it may be roughly positively correlated. We also report the average portfolio holding period returns as well as the Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor αs over Quarter 1. Looking at the relation between Quarter 0 and Quarter 1 returns, we see that the returns of quintile portfolios in Quarter 1 are consistent with the momentum phenomenon. This panel suggests that if one were to buy stocks in the winner portfolio and short those in the loser portfolio, he could earn a superior return of 2.23% per quarter (before transaction costs). Though the t-statistic on the three-factor portfolio α is 3.01, that on the 4-factor α return is, as expected, statistically insignificant. Results sorted on momentum in the prior year are similar in terms of significance: the momentum strategy allows for a significantly positive return of 1.09% ( α = 1.64%) over the subsequent quarter.
The numbers in Panel A suggest that there is a non-monotonic, but positive, relationship between IVOL up and prior returns. Thus, combining the momentum effect of stock returns with the price reversal effect of IVOL up may further enhance the momentum strategy. Table IX, Panel B, where we report the returns to momentum portfolios after controlling for IVOL up (which allows us to examine implications for subsequent returns when we sort stocks first on Quarter 0 upside IVOL and then on returns) sheds light on this possibility. From the bottom row of the upper subpanel (where the second of the sequential sorts is based on Quarter 0 returns), we see that, on average, momentum is not driven by differences in upside return variation (it remains significant even after controlling for return volatility). In particular, after accounting for IVOL up , the winners from the Quarter 0 outperform the losers by 2.26% per quarter (in absolute value, t = 2.64). In fact, this subpanel also shows that momentum is significantly more pronounced in the high IVOL portfolios.
For example, while the difference in Quarter 1 returns between "winners" and "losers" in the previous quarter is a highly significant 5.53% in the high volatility portfolio, this difference decreases to an insignificant −0.29 in the low volatility portfolio. We see similar results in the lower subpanel of Panel B, where the second of the sequential sorts is on prior year return (over months −11
to −1). Specifically, controlling first for Quarter 0 upside return variation and then for prior year returns, the difference between returns in the high and low return portfolio is 1.01% ( t = 2.04).
Thus, controlling for upside "risk" can substantially enhance the performance of the momentum portfolio. Furthermore, if we look only at the return to the momentum strategy in the high upside volatility portfolio, it is 2.85% ( t = 3.77). Overall, we see that sorting on upside return variation can significantly enhance the momentum strategy: focusing only on stocks in the high IVOL up portfolio, performance of momentum strategies based on returns over months −2 to 0 (−11 to −1)
increases from 2.23% to 5.53% (1.09% to 2.85%).
Since IVOL up is negatively correlated with size (see Table III ), it is possible that part of the increase of momentum profits is due to a size effect. As documented in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) , the momentum effect is stronger for smaller firms. Thus, for comparison, we also examine the size effect on the momentum strategy. Unreported results are consistent with Hong, Lim, and
Stein (2000): the momentum effect is strongest among the smallest stocks. Nonetheless, the effect of size in enhancing the momentum profit is smaller than that of IVOL up . For example, in the lowest size quintile, the return difference between past winners and losers based on the past three month returns is only 3.19% in our sample.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the cross-sectional relationship between volatility and expected returns.
We confirm the findings of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006a) that, cross-sectionally, stocks with high volatility tend to have low subsequent returns. This result is inconsistent with both traditional finance theory that suggests that investors will not be compensated for bearing idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Markowitz (1952) ) and with theory that suggests that investors will demand a risk premium for withstanding high volatility (e.g., Merton (1987) ).
We seek to resolve this anomaly by breaking idiosyncratic volatility into "upside" and "downside" components which, respectively, correspond to volatility of positive and negative idiosyncratic returns. Though we expect that investors would be more concerned with downside risk (or significant negative return volatility), we actually find that stocks with negative return volatility do not earn superior returns. In contrast, stocks with large positive return volatility have lower subsequent returns than those with less upside volatility. Our results suggest that investors do not misprice downside risk when valuing stocks.
We also form an additional measure that examines the asymmetric nature of returns. Results using this measure suggest that when the level of asymmetric volatility is large and positive (i.e., there is significantly more downside risk than upside return variation), investors are compensated for bearing this risk. Finally, we show not only that upside volatility has greater predictive power for returns than does the traditional measure of total idiosyncratic volatility, but, more importantly, excluding stocks with high upside variation can enhance a basic momentum strategy by nearly 4% per quarter. Our results are robust to controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, and liquidity.
The results in this paper may be extended in several interesting directions. Existing literature documents another puzzle: on the index level, the risk of stochastic volatility is positively priced, whereas on stock level it is negatively priced. There is also an unusually high risk premium on jumps to the S&P 500 index. The above findings offer a potential reconciliation of this anomaly, and this implication can be easily tested. Other extensions would be to further relate our findings to stocks with different levels of liquidity (see, for example, Spiegel and Wang (2006) ), and to explore the effect of information events on stocks with high positive (negative) levels of asymmetric volatility. Additionally, the finding that there is only return predictability for those stocks that experience gradual upside return variation makes one wonder why not all upside return variation is priced. To explore this result, one might combine our dataset with intra-day trading behavior data.
Finally, the evidence presented in this paper explains the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent returns at the cross-sectional level. But, especially in light of Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) who find that investors require compensation for bearing downside systematic risk, our findings raise another important question: why don't investors care about downside idiosyncratic risk? We leave each of these issues for future research. The average portfolio holding period returns over the next two periods are reported for both the monthly and quarterly frequency. Future idiosyncratic volatility of the quintile portfolios are also reported to illustrate cross-sectional persistence. The Fama-French 3-factor α and Carhart 4-factor α are also reported to show the robustness against the effects of size, book to market, and momentum.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Asymmetric Stock Return Distributions
This figure plots the asymmetric stock return distributions for stocks with different characteristics, namely size, book-to-market, momentum, and turnover. The density function is approximated using asymmetric normal densities, given in footnote #, and quarterly median up and downside volatility in each stock group as reported in Table III .
Figure 2: Relation between VOL up and Stock Returns over Extended Horizons
This figure plots the average return differentials over month (quarter) t + 1 to t + 6 between the top and bottom quintile portfolios formed in month (quarter) t according to IVOL up . The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence band.
